Types of "engine":
  • Management engine which can do many things, including network access and remote control.

  • Trusted module which contains crypto keys and runs crypto algorithms.

  • Trusted store which contains an audit trail of system actions.

Some/all of these used to be a separate chip (co-processor) from the CPU, or a dedicated part of the CPU (secure enclave), but now often they're a separate part of the same silicon ("SoC") so no one can spy on the connection between CPU and security.

Wikipedia's "Trusted execution environment"
/u/SupposedlyImSmart on reddit 11/2018

TPM (Trusted Platform Module)

TPM 1.x and TPM 2 are quite different. In the future, there will be "Pluton", which is backward-compatible with TPM (2?), but has TPM functionality on same chip die as the CPU, and adds more functions.

What a TPM can do/provide:
  • Provide a hardware random-number generator (RNG).

  • Provide hardware hash and encryption functions.

  • Generate and store cryptographic keys, maybe in association with a password supplied by the user.

  • Provide Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) that form history chains.
    "each operation that wants to add a value to these PCRs doesn't set them, but rather 'extends' them, which essentially means creating a new hash based on the current value plus the new value".

  • Store a private key, so OS/software holding the public key can securely communicate with TPM.

nandhithakamal's "How to TPM - Part 1: TPM Vocabulary"
nandhithakamal's "How to TPM - Part 2 : TPM Software Stack"
Paolo Fabio Zaino's "Hardware: TPM module"

What a TPM can be used for:
  • Automatic disk decryption at boot, using a key stored in the TPM, so the disk can't be attached to any other system and decrypted.

  • Measured boot, where each step's check-sum is added to a PCR and if the final result doesn't match the expected value, something has been changed / tampered with.

Secure Boot does not require a TPM; see "misperceptions" list in Wilkins and Richardson's "UEFI Secure Boot in Modern Computer Security Solutions". There are ways that Secure Boot can use a TPM to provide enhanced features ?

Paraphrased from MiniTool's "AMD CPU fTPM":
"There are 5 types of TPM 2.0 implementations: Firmware TPM (fTPM), Discrete TPM (dTPM), Software TPM (sTPM), Integrated TPM (iTPM), Hypervisor TPM (hTPM)."

In Windows, check by pressing Windows Key + R, type "tpm.msc", then click OK.

In Linux, check via:
"fwupdmgr security --force".
"cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm0/tpm_version_major"
"sudo fwupdtool security --force" (security state of system)

In BIOS, Advanced Settings, there may be choice between fTPM (firmware TPM) or Discrete TPM. Also there is Intel PTT.

AMD Security Processor may serve as a TPM; your OS may say you have a TPM even though there is no TPM option in BIOS.

Michael Peters' "What Can You Do with a TPM?"
ArchWiki's "Trusted Platform Module"
Microsoft's "TPM recommendations"
Microsoft's "How Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module"
Raymond Chen's "Notes on BitLocker and the TPM and the pre-boot password or PIN"
Dell's "Dell Trusted Device: BIOS Security"
Will Arthur, David Challener, and Kenneth Goldman's "A Practical Guide to TPM 2.0" (book)
Lenovo's "A Technical Introduction to the Use of Trusted Platform Module 2.0 with Linux"
Paolo Fabio Zaino's "Linux: What can I do with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM)?"
Pid Eins's "The Strange State of Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Generic Linux Distributions"

From someone on reddit 7/2021:
A big advantage is that the TPM is a separate physical device not all that coupled to the main system, is designed to be physically difficult to impossible to get keys out of, and can enforce brute-force protections via hardware. Every time you fail a PIN, it exponentially backs off and saves that state even across power state changes.

Those keys can be protected not only with a PIN but also with a measurement state of files used to boot the system, up to and including the kernel and loaded modules. That's where things get more complicated, and very inflexible related to the more-freewheeling nature of Linux use vs. Windows use.

I think that difference, as well as possibly a bit of a lingering mistrust (not necessarily unfounded) in TPM manufacturers and the government make TPM much less trusted in general by the open source community. TPM design itself is definitely not open source.

I feel like we've gotten to a very good state regarding TPMs in the Linux world. If you want to be a "user" and run a distro from a vendor, you can enable secure boot and do that. If you want to be a "developer" and modify your system at will, then not as much, ...

"... just about any modern PC, phone, or tablet is relying on some kind of TPM or TPM-like device to provide disk encryption and other security protections. ChromeOS uses TPMs, Android phones use TPMs or equivalent features, and Apple's devices all use the 'Secure Enclave' to handle many TPM-ish functions."

"China has its own [alternative] standard called the Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM)"



# kernel modules, but they may include non-TPM2:
ls -la /lib/modules/`uname -r`/kernel/drivers/char/tpm

ls -l /dev/tpm*
dmesg -T | grep -i tpm
cat /sys/class/tpm/tpm*/tpm_version_major

sudo apt install tpm2-tools
man -k tpm2
sudo tpm2_getcap algorithms | less
sudo tpm2_getcap commands | less
sudo tpm2_getcap properties-fixed | less
sudo tpm2_selftest --fulltest --verbose ; echo $?

# TPM2 Access Broker and Resource Manager
sudo systemctl status tpm2-abrmd --full --lines 1000
sudo dnf install tpm2-abrmd
sudo systemctl enable tpm2-abrmd
sudo systemctl start tpm2-abrmd

sudo dnf install tss2
sudo tssgetcapability -cap 0 | less
man -k tss2

Paolo Fabio Zaino's "Linux: Configure and use your TPM 2.0 module on Linux"
James Bottomley's "TPM2 and Linux"
"Use TPM2.0 to securely decrypt the hard drive in Linux"
Kowalski7cc's "Automatic LUKS 2 disk decryption with TPM 2 and Clevis on Fedora 31"
Philippe Daouadi's "The ultimate guide to Full Disk Encryption with TPM and Secure Boot"

From someone on reddit 4/2022:
[In latest Arch and Fedora, use systemd-cryptenroll:]


systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-device=auto --tpm2-pcrs=7+8 $device 
sed -ie '/^luks-/s/$/,tpm2-device=auto/' /etc/crypttab
dracut -f

Dan Goodin's "Trusted platform module security defeated in 30 minutes"

Firmware TPM

From Helge Klein's "Why Your Machine (Almost Certainly) Has a TPM":
"... chances are excellent that your CPU has an embedded TPM. Ever since Skylake (6th gen), nearly all Intel CPUs have an embedded TPM 2.0 that Intel calls Platform Trust Technology (PTT). AMD CPUs have an embedded TPM 2.0 called fTPM since the AM4 platform (2016)."

MiniTool's "AMD CPU fTPM"

Intel Management Engine (AMA "ME" or "CSME")

Wikipedia's "Intel Management Engine"
Intel's "Intel Converged Security and Management Engine (Intel CSME)"
Lily Hay Newman's "Intel Chip Flaws Leave Millions of Devices Exposed"
Erica Portnoy and Peter Eckersley's "Intel's Management Engine is a security hazard, and users need a way to disable it"
coreboot Wiki's "Intel Management Engine"
Igor Skochinsky's "Intel ME Secrets"
"AMT for Linux"
From someone on reddit:
"Do you have an Intel CPU from the last 10+ years? If so, then yes ME is enabled. If it weren't via HAP, you'd know."
Shane McGlaun's "Here's How To Disable Intel Management Engine And Slam Its Alleged Security Backdoor Shut"
"Sakaki's EFI Install Guide / Disabling the Intel Management Engine"
Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols' "Computer vendors start disabling Intel Management Engine"
Skochinsky and Corna's "Intel ME: Myths And Reality" (PDF)
corna's "me_cleaner"
Vault Labs' "What every CISO and security engineer should know about Intel CSME"
Intel Management Engine Interface driver for Linux
Intel Management Engine Client bus API for Linux
Russell Coker's "AMT/MEBX on Debian"
"ls /dev/mei*"

Test your system ?
Intel's "Management Engine Critical Firmware Update (Intel-SA-00086)"

intelmetool from coreboot / coreboot ? But the project's build process is very strange, and failed for me. Also tried to build just intelmetool, and failed.

From someone on reddit:
"After I did the firmware update for my version of IME, I just made sure and disabled everything relating to IME/vPro in my BIOS/UEFI settings and also disabled its related services and related serial port in device manager in Windows."

From someone on reddit:
"Intel ME listens on ports 623, 664 and 16992-16995. So if you're behind a firewall block these ports. Though you'd be better off to create a whitelist instead."


AMD's PSP (Platform Security Processor) and CCP (Cryptographic Coprocessor) hardware.

Wikipedia's "AMD Platform Security Processor"
Google's "AMD Secure Processor for Confidential Computing - Security Review"
"What is known about the capabilities of AMD's Secure Processor?"
"AMD PSP 2.0 AMD Secure Processor"
Apparently this just verifies firmware contents, it has no remote capability ? But see: reddit thread

sudo lshw -class generic
sudo ss -lptun | grep :8732	# supposedly listens here; not on my system

sudo dmesg -T | egrep -i 'ccp|psp'
grep -i ccp /proc/crypto
modinfo ccp
Greg Marsden's "Using AMD Secure Memory Encryption with Oracle Linux"
CCP-related source code in kernel
more kernel code
OpenSSL and AMD Cryptographic CoProcessor (CCP)
"apt show librte-pmd-ccp20.0"
"apt show dpdk"
AMD CCP dev says it's a BIOS issue.


Chiefio's "For deep security, use ARM, avoid Intel & AMD processors"
But ARM has "TrustZone", used in Android at least ? Article

Anton Shilov's "HP's Endpoint Security Controller: More Details About A New Chip in HP Notebooks"

Eduard Kovacs' "Microsoft Unveils 'Pluton' Security Processor for PCs"
Matthew Garrett's "Pluton is not (currently) a threat to software freedom"
Matthew Garrett's "AMD's Pluton implementation seems to be controllable"

Raspberry Pi has GPU acting as a management engine:

If you're using a "server" motherboard:
You might have a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC) or IPMI.
Chris Siebenmann's "Sorting out IPMI and BMC terminology and technology"
Patrick Kennedy's "Explaining the Baseboard Management Controller or BMC in Servers"
"ipmitool" or "ls -d /dev/ipmi*" on Linux.
Wikipedia's "Out-of-band management"

One idea: don't connect network to motherboard's network interface, instead use a third-party network interface board, which the ME shouldn't know how to use.

From article:
"When an iPhone is turned off, most wireless chips stay on. For instance, upon user-initiated shutdown, the iPhone remains locatable via the Find My network. If the battery runs low, the iPhone shuts down automatically and enters a power reserve mode. Yet, users can still access credit cards, student passes, and other items in their Wallet. ... On recent iPhones, Bluetooth, Near Field Communication (NFC), and Ultra-wideband (UWB) keep running after power off ..."